ABBY JOHNSON'S

INTERVIEW WITH IRENE NAVIS

EUREKA COUNTY, NEVADA

YUCCA MOUNTAIN LESSONS LEARNED PROJECT

held in

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

May 19, 2011

MS. CLANCY: This is May 19, 2011. We are in Las Vegas, Nevada. This is Gwen Clancy running the camera. And, doing the interview today is Abby Johnson.

MS. JOHNSON: My name is Abby Johnson. I'm the Nuclear Waste Advisor for Eureka County, Nevada. This is the Eureka County Lessons Learned video project, and today we are interviewing Irene Navis. She works for Clark County and she has two jobs. She is the Manager of the Nuclear Waste Division, and she's also the Director of the Office of Emergency Management, and Homeland Security.

Irene, tell us about your background, when you came to Nevada, and how you came to be the Director--the Manager of the Clark County Nuclear Waste Program.

MS. NAVIS: Absolutely. I came to Clark County about 23 years ago. My husband and I were married for about six months, and we decided we needed to move to Nevada for some opportunities for school and for jobs. So, he went to UNLV, and I went to Clark County and got a job in the Planning Department. I spent 22 ½ years in the Planning Department, and just recently moved on to the County Manager's office.

When I first went to Clark County, I started out doing development and review, and signing off on permits and applications, and approving subdivisions, and things like that, and moved my way through the Planning Department,

eventually landing a management position, where I oversaw organizational development and HR and strategic planning and regional planning.

In the course of that work, I started working with the Nuclear Waste Division, and the manager at the time, Dennis Bechtel, on strategic planning, answer to future thinking and future activities for that division.

In the course of that work, I got very interested in the Nuclear Waste program and started to get very familiar with what it was all about, what the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was all about, and, in fact, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and I entered Clark County at the same time, in December of 1987.

After Dennis decided to retire, my director at the time, approached me and asked me if I wanted to take over the Nuclear Waste Division, because of my interest, and I sort of picked up on the nuances of the program fairly quickly, and he thought I would be a good logical replacement for Dennis, and asked me to take it on, so I did. So, I've been doing that for about ten years now.

And, then, ten months ago, I was approached by the County Manager and asked if I would be interested in being the Emergency Manager for Clark County. There were some transitions and some personnel changes being made, and I was asked if I would take that on, in light of the fact that the Yucca Mountain Program was looking like it was going to be

ending. Well, so far, that hasn't happened, so now I have two jobs.

MS. JOHNSON: What is the overlap between your nuclear waste job and your emergency management job?

MS. NAVIS: You know, there's all kinds of overlap, and I anticipated some, but really in the Emergency Preparedness arena and the Public Safety arena, the same stakeholder group that I had worked with on Yucca Mountain, ideas related to public safety and how we can best prepare first responders in case of an emergency, those are the same stakeholders I deal with in the Emergency Management arena. I now chair a committee that I used to belong to as a member, the local Emergency Planning Committee, so that family of folks who are involved in public health and public safety and emergency management, everybody from the fire fighters to the coroner, sit around that table and discuss issues related to public safety. So, it was a pretty smooth transition in figuring out who the right stakeholders are.

And, there are times, like the Japan incident with the nuclear power plants, where those two jobs really converged. And, both of my staffs were getting phone calls about different rumors that we were hearing, about a cloud coming across the ocean and through California, and into the rest of the United States potentially, questions about safety in flying and tourism, and was it safe to come to Las Vegas

in light of the cloud that was coming across the ocean from Japan, and looking at radiation levels, and getting information out to the public about what was correct and what was rumor, and that sort of thing, and I had both my staffs working on that same issue together. So, that was kind of an interesting merger.

MS. JOHNSON: Fascinating. Let's move on to the next question.

On the wall next to you, we have the nuclear age timeline, which starts in the Forties, and unfortunately, only goes to the Nineties. But, it occurs to me that Clark County has been part of the nuclear age almost from the beginning.

MS. NAVIS: That's absolutely correct, Abby. And, I love this graphic because it really tells you the entire history of Atomic Energy, from the very beginning and then on through the war times and the bomb making in the mid Forties, and we know what happened there in terms of the ending of World War II, because of that activity, and then what it led to is a robust and very active Atomic Energy Program in the United States. And, we're one of the forerunners in the entire world on the development of atomic energy, and it took us into the 1950's and 1960's, and the history of the Nevada Test Site, and the support for war time and cold war activities of the Test Site is internationally known.

And, Clark County played a huge role in that, whether it's the tourism connection that took place in the Fifties and Sixties. I know that I've read books and articles about the hotels actually having Miss Atomic Bomb contests, and tourism related activities related to atomic energy, and named drinks at the bars, you know, sort of some kind of atomic name to go along with that theme. It was really a tourism promotion back in those days.

And, the Atomic Energy Commission was really active in putting out information of concern to the schools and to the public about the safety of atomic energy, and the testing that was going on at the time.

And, that period really shaped the opinion of Clark County residents who learned later that what was being put forward by the Atomic Energy Commission in terms of safety information wasn't necessarily accurate. And, folks who have lived here a long time, like my in-laws, really experienced the after effects of those tests in their health, as did a lot of people, and that really shaped, I think, the lack of support for additional nuclear activity that would have been coming with the Yucca Mountain Project.

MS. JOHNSON: Do you think that the fact that the Department of Energy is the successor to the original Atomic Energy Commission made the connection for people that it was essentially the same people?

MS. NAVIS: I think it did. I think people didn't really see a difference, and people don't often see a difference among federal agencies. I think that's been an issue in this program all along, and I think a lot of people don't remember or don't recognize or were not aware that the NRC, which is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Energy used to really be part of that same Atomic Energy commission agency. And, it was as they moved down the road to this idea of a nuclear waste repository, that they actually split. Some folks never recognized, and even maybe some folks in those agencies, never recognized that they had split and should be two separate and distinct entities.

And, it wasn't until much later in the process, after a lot of, I think, community protest and public opinion about the appearance of being too connected with each other that things started to change a little bit with the NRC, and we saw some successes in our efforts, in public outreach, and we'll talk about that a little bit later, I'm sure.

MS. JOHNSON: I'm sure we will. Let's move on to the next question.

Irene, can you tell us about Clark County's nuclear waste program and specifically, the County's concerns and the steps you've taken to protect Clark County's interests?

MS. NAVIS: Absolutely, Abby.

The Clark County Commissioners have been opposed to the Yucca Mountain Repository Project since the very early days that it was introduced to Nevada at all, so 1982, 1983 time frame, the Commissioners started to weigh in. By 1985, they had adopted a formal resolution in opposition to the repository, and I believe to date, they are the county who was most vocal and the most strongly worded in their resolution, and have been ever since. They have passed a number of resolutions, seven or eight of them, over the years, with that consistent opposition, sometimes in certain activities like the transportation piece, or the public safety piece, that they express concern over, but always consistently opposed.

It's been very interesting in Clark County that it hasn't mattered who the county manager is, or the configuration of the county commissioners, that opposition has remained steadfast.

MS. JOHNSON: So, how does the opposition of the County translate into a work program using Oversight Funds?

MS. NAVIS: That's been a real delicate balance that I believe we achieved. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act is very prescriptive of what affected units of local government should focus on and are allowed to do. Appropriations language that we also have to live with out of the Congressional Appropriation for the funding that we receive

also has some requirements in it. For example, we can only focus on public outreach within the State of Nevada. We can't build coalitions with other states, and we can't lobby or litigate with that fund.

So, what we want to make sure we always do is leverage out resources and focus on those program areas that we're allowed to do, and make sure that the commissioners understand that we will always couch our program in light of their opposition, but we also have to go into fact-finding and research that could uncover some things that may be more favorable to the program than their opposition might suggest.

And, so, finding that delicate balance of being factual and credible and keeping our integrity, while still putting forward that strong opposition of the Commission, has been our priority throughout the course of our program. What I had always directed my staff to do is stay out of the politics, focus on the research, focus on the assessments, focus on putting good factual, reliable, understandable information out to the public, and making sure that the politicians focus on the politics.

MS. JOHNSON: Let's talk about transportation for a minute. I've got a couple of maps here that depict what the transportation looks like for rail and for truck, and I know that transportation is a big concern of Clark County's.

MS. NAVIS: Absolutely. You know, Abby, in Clark

County, we have a number of transportation routes that are very prominent. We have Interstate 15, we have U.S. Highway 93 and 95, and then we also have the Union Pacific Railroad coming right through Clark County in both the urban and the rural parts of Clark County. The I-15 and the railroad tracks pass right past my office in downtown Las Vegas, and they also pass right behind the Las Vegas strip.

And, the Las Vegas strip, a lot of folks don't know, is actually within unincorporated Clark County, not within the City of Las Vegas jurisdiction, and so anything that happens along that corridor in terms of a public safety or a public health issue, is of grave concern to the County because that is the economic engine of not only Clark County, but the entire state in terms of gaming revenues, and room taxes, and property value taxes.

So, it was very important early on for the Commissioners that we protect that corridor and make sure that that transportation scheme, whatever it was, for the Department of Energy did not unduly impact the urban core of Clark County, as well as our rural communities.

MS. JOHNSON: Yes, as a representative of rural areas, you know, we think that the transportation should be so safe that it could go anywhere.

MS. NAVIS: Absolutely.

MS. JOHNSON: It shouldn't be jeopardizing

anybody's health and safety.

MS. NAVIS: That's right, and you can't say one is more important than the other, because if you, for example, if they found a route that avoided the urban corridor or the urban highway and rail area, that would just put the pressure out into the rural areas of the county and into other counties that are less protected when it comes to public safety, in fact. Most of them are volunteer fire fighters or volunteer police or volunteer EMT's that man those areas, and don't have, for example, a sophisticated HAZMAT unit and equipment that could detect radiation. That's not something you would normally put in a rural fire station.

And, so, again, a balancing act of making sure the urban, more economically robust areas were treated a certain way and protected, but also looking out for the rural communities we deal with in Clark County.

MS. JOHNSON: Yes. Tell us, now that we're talking about emergency management a little bit, tell us about hospitals in Clark County being used for radiation accidents.

MS. NAVIS: University Medical Center, UMC, in Clark County is a county funded, county supported hospital. It is the only trauma unit, Trauma I unit, in the entire region. It is the only burn unit in the entire region, and it is a hospital where a lot of times injured workers, even from the strip, are brought because of the fact that we have

that trauma capability, and all of the bells and whistles needed for a very serious injury, including severe burns and radiation exposure.

So, typically when workers get hurt out at the Test Site, they were always brought to UMC because we had that capacity. And, Nye County, where the Test Site and Yucca Mountain actually are, have not had that. And, the Department of Energy's plan, when they announced to us what they were going to do in terms of public safety and emergency management, was to utilize Clark County's hospital for those services, and not provide it in Nye County, to the extent that it would be needed to support all of those workers, and potentially residents out there.

MS. JOHNSON: Would they cover the costs?

MS. NAVIS: Actually, we hadn't even gotten that far, and University Medical Center wasn't even aware that that was DOE's plan. That was something that one of my staff happened to be in a meeting, where it was discussed, and brought that information back, and the hospital had never heard that that was really the plan.

And, in fact, that was one of the exceptions that we took to DOE's transportation scheme and the repository itself was they were not very clear or very detailed about how things like public safety would actually unfold, and who would be responsible, and how those interactions would be

between the federal government and the state and the county, and we did not feel they did an adequate job of really addressing that.

MS. JOHNSON: Let's move on to the next question.

Irene, I know that Clark County's Nuclear Waste Program has a very strong public information component. I know it's one of the things under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act that counties are directed to do. Could you tell us about your program, and your efforts to inform and involve the public? Which I know can be challenging.

MS. NAVIS: It sure can, especially in a county as dynamic as Clark County has been for a number of years. Of course, our growth has slowed in the last couple of years, but for about 15 years, we had 5,000 new people moving into Clark County every single month. Every year, it would be like adding a new small town to our jurisdiction. And, so, with that kind of turnover and that kind of new population, it was always a challenge to come up with information and new material that would make people pay attention, that would help them understand the issue, and always mindful that we were getting sort of a new crop of people to educate and inform and involve over a period of years.

Clark County's program in Outreach has been in existence over 20 years. But, in the last decade, with my involvement, we've really decided to move into a new

direction, and sort of elevate what we had already been doing for a number of years.

It was very clear to us that this was going to be a very long-term project, that it was going to go on for a number of generations into the future. We wanted to focus on a multi-generational approach, and so we have worked with everything from third graders to seniors in senior centers, and everybody in between.

Believe it or not, one of the tools that we found most effective is the pod cast. Pod casting is sort of a radio on demand program that folks can download from our website. They can put it on their I-pod. A lot of kids in college and in high school use it for book reports, for presentations, for research that they're doing for a school project. And, so, that would lead them to look at our website and gather additional information.

We have a kid's page on our website that addresses elementary to middle school children. We have a robust program where we have gone into the schools. Just this year, we went into 40 different schools at third and fourth grade level, and some middle schools to not per se talk about what we think are the dangers or the risks of the program. It's more general about radiation, about geology, about the species that live in the area of Yucca Mountain, and sort of the demographics of the issue, as opposed to what we feel

might be risks related to transportation and public safety, which are not appropriate for a third grader.

We have discussed this in different professional organizations. We get invited to speak all over the place here in Clark County to address the issue of what's going on with the program, what is the County's position on the program, which was when we first started, not very well known among the public as to what's the County's role, what is the position, why do you care about something that's in Nye County. Why should I care about something that's happening in Nye County?

So, including information in our program that resonates with the public has always been a challenge, but I think we found ways to do that, by getting very specific on the issues, and by looking for what would make this group of people care about this issue.

We have worked extensively with Native American community and we've done videos and things that have worked very well.

One of the things we realized is we were filling a gap in information and approach that was not being utilized by the federal government. The Department of Energy was doing Outreach a certain way. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was doing Outreach a certain way. And, here, you have this little poster that talks about the NRC's approach,

and a lot of the information, how they provided it at first, when we first started dealing with them, was sort of one way, them pushing information out, and us listening and being expected to just accept it and just receive it.

Over time, we were able to be very successful I think as a group of affected units of local government, in convincing the NRC that they could do better. And, in fact, they did do better. Over time, their meetings were more productive, more interactive, more inclusive. They actually came to us and asked us about strategies for public Outreach and what type of meeting would be more effective. What format, what location. And, I think they ended up with better work products, and certainly better information flow between local government, the citizens, the state and themselves. And, so, that was, to me, one example of how we were influential in directing and making sure the federal government heard what we were trying to say.

MS. JOHNSON: You were talking about the role of the affected units of local government in affecting policy and decision making. Can you explain what the AULGs are, and in what ways local governments have been able to make a difference, in addition to what you discussed?

MS. NAVIS: Sure. The affected units of local government are actually designated through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It’s interesting and I think not a lot of people

know about this, that when we were first designated only three counties were designated, and that was Clark County, of course, Nye County, and Lincoln County, where it was apparently thought by the Secretary of Energy, who made the designation, that the affected county obviously where the repository would be going was--should be designated, and then Clark County as the most populous county with some transportation issues might be affected, and then Lincoln County with transportation issues related to perhaps rail and highway was also designated. The other counties, like yours, Eureka County, actually had to be designated later through the efforts of legal action that were taken by some of the counties. And, that's how we went from three counties to ten, nine in Nevada and Inyo County in California.

I think the counties have enjoyed a very good collaborative relationship, and those collaborations have resulted in influence over the federal side of the program. For example, in some of the technical studies that we worked on, or review of the Department of Energy's documents that they would put out as part of the environmental review process. I believe that collaboration and using a lot of the same types of comments and raising the same types of issues made the Department of Energy sort of step back and look at it and say, gee, they're all saying it. Maybe they're onto something here.

We felt very successful in Clark County when the Department of Energy's Draft Environmental Impact Study came out. They said there were no negative impacts, essentially, and certainly would not acknowledge property value impacts or tourism impacts related to the stigma of having the facility like a repository so nearby Clark County.

By the time the Final EIS came out, Clark County had done some studies that the Department of Energy reviewed, tore apart, reviewed again, and actually paid people to poke holes in the studies, could not poke holes, and, therefore, acknowledged in their Final EIS that those impacts were real, and should be acknowledged, and included that in their final document. So, we felt that was a huge success for us, to go from there are no negative impacts, to acknowledging something so vital to us as a county.

MS. JOHNSON: The other area where the affected units of local government came together was to provide impact assessment reports to the State of Nevada prior to the site designation by the Secretary of Energy.

MS. NAVIS: That's right. There were I think a lot of common issues among the counties. Even if we didn't have the same perspective, there were a lot of common threads that we could identify and work on together. And, so, there was a lot of collaboration and comparison, sort of looking at well, how are you addressing this, and how are you going to address

transportation, and making sure we had some common threads there.

And, then, each county was then able to put their own perspective in and submit a report that the State packaged together and submitted to the Secretary of Energy and to the President of the United States prior to that site recommendation that happened in early 2002.

I think from those collaborative efforts, we did realize that we had some common ground to work from, and we used that as a building block for further collaborative efforts down the line. Two big examples that I can think of is the funding. The Department of Energy, for years, tried to give us little or no funding very often, and had settled on an amount of around $4 million for many years in a row.

MS. JOHNSON: That's for ten counties?

MS. NAVIS: For ten counties to share. And, the way the rules worked, as you know, that we had to decide amongst ourselves how to divide up that funding. For a number of years, there was sort of a standard formula that people came up with and agreed to. And, then, the game sort of changed over time, and things got a little more contentious, I think, between some of the counties and the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy started ratcheting up towards licensing, and there was a situation created where we really had to either come together and work

things out among the ten of us, or we were going to splinter apart.

And, I think using a very solid strategy of collaboration and working through issues, we were able to not only maintain the level of funding we were used to, but also increased the level of funding. We went from a kind of a standard formula that I mentioned earlier, to a needs based approach based on a review of our program, and what we really needed to provide to our citizenry, and each county presented what they needed, and then we submitted that request to the Department of Energy.

So, we ended up going from about a $4 million level to very quickly to a $7 million level, and almost doubled our allocation, which helped us really be much more effective and much more inclusive of our public in our respective counties, and do a better job communicating with the Department of Energy and do a more complete job on our studies. So, that level of funding, in my opinion, made us more effective as a group, and also separately in our own programs.

I think the other thing that we did that was very effective was remove some obstacles that the Department of Energy put before us. Part of the requirement for receiving our funding as a pass through from the Department of Energy, and I know you will remember these days of working through many, many drafts of a work plan, which had to be submitted

before we could get our funding.

I think DOE found that that was a way to delay the receipt of our funding, and used it as a tool against us primarily. And, it was a very contentious time. I think it created a lot of animosity that didn't need to be there. And, it, in a strange way, sort of drew the counties closer together to come up with a strategy for how to get rid of that obstacle.

We ended up looking at a way to change bill language to remove that responsibility, or that perceived responsibility of the DOE to actually review our work plans.

The other aspect of that is as we got closer to licensing, we realized the people who we may be opposed to in the licensing proceeding were going to be able to review and dictate what our work plan looked like prior to us actually executing it, thereby potentially keeping us from being effective in the licensing proceeding.

So, we were able to come up with bill language that we were able to propose and get put into the federal law, essentially, that said that the Department of Energy first had to fund us for licensing activities, which was not clear to them that they had to do, and also how that was going to play out in terms of work plans and their ability to be an obstacle to us in the licensing proceeding. I think that's our greatest success as a group.

MS. CLANCY: Okay, now we're rolling, Tape 2, and you can go ahead, Abby. Okay, Abby?

MS. JOHNSON: Irene, I know that Clark County has made a special effort to involve the Native American tribes and residents in the county. Can you tell us about that, and especially the involvement of one of the most effective people I think is Calvin Myers?

MS. NAVIS: Oh, absolutely. Calvin was for a long time a member of our advisory committee at Clark County on Yucca Mountain issues. We worked extensively with him as he has played different roles. Within them, the Moapa Paiute tribe. He also worked with the Las Vegas band of Paiutes. Those are the two entities that we worked with the most, also the Western Shoshone and Southern Paiutes. But, we really wanted to focus on efforts on the two tribes most affected within Clark County.

The Department of Energy left a gap there for us. They did not acknowledge these two tribal entities as an affected unit of government, which they could have, and in fact eventually did, the Thimbu Shoshone in Death Valley.

Since the tribes did not enjoy that particular status, we thought it would be important to enter into inter-local agreements with them, provide them funding to do impact assessment and public Outreach of their own. And, all those efforts that we did with them, to support them and include

them in Clark County's research and program led to this Indian Perspectives on Yucca Mountain, both the document which was a series of interviews with tribal elders and other residents, and then the DVD.

This has been used extensively across the country with other tribal entities. One of the tribal elders travels around and takes this with her and uses it to help people understand the Yucca Mountain issue. We have felt that it really captured the essence of the culture and the spiritual nature of the Native American population. It took a long time to gain their trust, and a long time to allow them--to convince them to allow us to put them on camera. It's not something they're comfortable doing. It's a cultural issue for them to be captured on film, but they felt this was so important that they allowed it and participated and have been very strong supporters of this process. We actually have won an award for public Outreach and communication with this tool.

MS. JOHNSON: Let's move on to the next question.

Irene, finally, I want to ask you about the Japanese disaster, the Japanese nuclear disaster, and how that is affecting thinking with the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's nuclear future, and with other federal agencies throughout the United States.

MS. NAVIS: Abby, we have been following the work

of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's nuclear future since that group's inception. That group was formed to study alternatives to Yucca Mountain with respect to disposal and disposition of nuclear waste materials.

When the Japan incident occurred, I think it sent a ripple effect through a number of government agencies, and also had an impact on the thinking and the work being done by the Blue Ribbon Commission. Certainly, the idea of a natural disaster, compounded by another natural disaster actually having impact of that magnitude on a nuclear power plant, is not something that has been anticipated in normal planning processes for emergency management.

There was a lot of confusion, a lot of concern, a lot of missing information about the potential damage and the radiological effects that actually occurred. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the United States actually sent folks over to Japan to assess the situation and report back.

They reported back to Congress, which then sent another ripple effect through a variety of agencies, including the Department of Energy, the NRC, and probably the Department of Defense, who has a nuclear component to it as well. So, that was all being noticed by the Blue Ribbon Commission, and they started looking at what is really the safest short-term and long-term way to deal with nuclear waste materials. That's the essential question is what do we

do in the immediate future to address the concerns of today, and what do we do for the long view and what is the safest?

And, so, I think that the recent report that came out by the Blue Ribbon Commission realized--has acknowledged that keeping nuclear waste materials in spent fuel pools for a long period of time is not the best idea, because that was really the crux of the problem in the Japan reactors. I think that they realized a short-term sort of quick fix, and something that each power plant can take responsibility for doing is what they call hardened on-site storage at the facility. And, that's their key recommendation, all the while acknowledging that for the long-term, a geologic repository is necessary.

The question then becomes what does that mean for Yucca Mountain? Does that mean Yucca Mountain becomes the de facto obvious answer for geologic repository? Not necessarily. The Blue Ribbon Commission was told to stay away from naming Yucca a potential solution. And, I think that most scientists and most of us who have been in this program understand the deep geologic repository is the right thing to do. I just don't think that everybody agrees Yucca Mountain is the one and only place for that.

So, for me, it remains to be seen what happens from here on out. But, I think that one positive outcome, if you want to put it that way, of the Japan situation is people

realized the immediacy of the problem, the seriousness of the problem, and the fact that there are multiple solutions that we could employ, and we don't have to zero in and focus on the one and only panacea that really isn't a panacea, that those spent fuel pools will always be at the reactors, regardless of whether we had Yucca Mountain as a repository, even in 1998 when it was supposed to be there.

MS. JOHNSON: Yes.

MS. NAVIS: We'd still have spent fuel pools stacked with spent fuel rods. So, how do you do that, and what is a better way to handle those materials? And, are our emergency plans and our personnel and our communities prepared to answer for the consequences and react better than what we saw happening in Japan? That's the other piece of it, is let's learn from the human reaction and the plans and processes in place, as well as the lesson of what do we do about the materials.

MS. JOHNSON: You've been involved with the Yucca Mountain program for many years. What are the lessons that you take away from the experience?

MS. NAVIS: I think one of the most important things that my team and I have learned over the past decade in working together is how important integrity is and credibility of the words you say and the documents that you put out and the materials that you present to the public.

The public trusts us to tell the truth, and it's very important that we do that in a very credible way, a very engaging way to keep them interested, and also to present all the information that we've gathered so that people can have a choice about what they believe.

We weren't out there trying to convince people that they have to be opposed to the repository. But, we wanted them to have enough information so they could make an informed choice, and that's really what people are looking for. From a public education campaign, from a technical and science perspective, I think what we have determined is whatever people thought was impossible, is possible, whether you're talking about the Japan disaster or 911, and what potential consequences are for human health and safety and for the environment. Anything is possible. You can call it a low probability, that doesn't mean zero probability.

And, so, people's concerns need to be listened to and addressed and treated as real, regardless of whether you agree or not as a government agency with that position.

MS. JOHNSON: Irene, thank you so much for your time.

MS. NAVIS: You're very welcome. I appreciate the opportunity.

MS. JOHNSON: And, we want to ask you one more question. We'll be using this material for--we'll be

archiving the interviews in their entirety, but also we'll be taking some clips for the web, and we want to make sure that you are comfortable with the use of your interview for those purposes.

MS. NAVIS: Absolutely.

MS. JOHNSON: Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, the interview of Irene Navis was concluded.)

TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing has been transcribed by me to the best of my ability, and constitutes a true and accurate transcript of the mechanically recorded proceedings in the above matter.

Dated at Aurora, Colorado, this 23rd day of June, 2011.

s/s Mary Chevalier

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